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Abstract 
To store and process sensitive data related to credit card, healthcare, financial, government which constitutes the big data, 
Hadoop environment is supplemented with HDFS i.e Hadoop Distributed File System, which is a cloud based, parallel 
processing, open framework. As the HDFS stores and process critical sensitive data, there is a great need for secure 
authentication service to authenticate and authorize the user connecting to HDFS. In 2014, Nivethitha et al has proposed first of 
its kind of authentication service for Hadoop using one time pad. Even though it is a novel attempt, in this paper, we will 
illustrate that, Nivethitha et al scheme is vulnerable to offline password guessing attack and on success of it, an attacker can 
perform all major attacks on HDFS. As a part of our contribution, we will device a new authentication service for hadoop 
framework which is light weight and resists all major attacks compared to Nivethitha et al. authentication service while 
maintaining the merits of their authentication service.  
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1. Introduction  
The rapid augmentation of online transaction-oriented data, flooding of unstructured data from online social 
media, exponential evolution of real time data from sensor networks and machine-to-machine communications 
results in variety of voluminous data collectively called Big data. Big data cannot be stored or processed through 
conventional storage or processing systems. To cater the enterprise data storage and processing needs, Apache 
developed Hadoop project which is a java based, open-source framework for distributed storage and processing of 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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enterprise data. In Hadoop framework, all the file storage activities are handled by HDFS i.e Hadoop distributed file 
system, which can store peta bytes of sensitive enterprise data. 
 
Preliminary security analysis [1,2,3,4] on Hadoop reveals that, to achieve strong authentication and authorization 
mechanism in Hadoop, there is acute need of secure and cost effective authentication service.  
 
In literature [1,2,3,4] there are four kinds of system architecture has been proposed for authentication service. 
Single server authentication service, simple multi-server model, gateway augmented multi-server model and two 
server model. Each architecture is having one or more pitfalls associated with it. Among them two server model is 
found to be effective [1,2,3].  
 
Fig.1.Hadoop two server authentication service model 
 
   Very few researchers have proposed authentication service for Hadoop framework based on the two server model. 
Nivethitha et al [1] has proposed a first of its kind of authentication service for Hadoop using One Time Pad. A user 
password is encrypted with the generated OTP in registration server and transmitted securely to the backend server. 
Nivethitha et al claimed that their Hadoop authentication service is secure and attack resistant. Sadasivam et al [2] 
has proposed an authentication service for Hadoop in cloud environment based on two server model, grounded on 
properties of a triangle, in which the user password separated in two back end servers to resists the attacks. 
 
In these next segments, we briefly review on authentication service proposed by Nivethitha et al [1] in section 2. In 
section 3, we do cryptanalysis on Nivethitha et al scheme. In section 4, we propose our improved authentication 
service for Hadoop. In section 5, we scrutinize the security strengths of our proposed framework. In section 6, we do 
a computation and communication cost analysis on our proposed framework and Nivethitha et al [1] authentication 
service. Section 7 provides the conclusion of our paper.  
2. Brief review of Nivethitha et al authentication service 




User Ui                                                        Registration Server (RS)                                              Backend Server (BS) 
 
Select IDi, PWi 
Submit {IDi, PWi} to R.S  
       {IDi,PWi}                                                                   {IDi, PWi} 
 
                                          Generate One Time Pad i.e OTP. 
                                          C1 = EOTP(PWi), C2 = C1 mod 26. 
                                          Store <C2> in database 
                                                                                                          {OTP} 
                                                                                                                       C3 = EPWi(OTP) 
                                                                                                                                     Store <IDi,C3> in database 
    This phase is invoked whenever a user Ui registers with Hadoop framework via registration server (R.S) for the 
first time. 
(R1). Ui opts his identity IDi, password PWi and submits the registration request {IDi, PWi} to RS, R.S forwards the 
same to B.S.  
Registration 
Server Back End Server 
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(R2) On receiving the registration request, R.S generates one time pad key i.e OTP and encrypts the user password 
PWi with the OTP generated i.e ciphertext C1 = EOTP(PWi) and generates cipher text C2  by applying mod on C1. 
i.eC2 = C1 mod 26. R.S stores cipher text <C2>in its database securely. R.S forwards OTP to B.S.  
(R3) B.S computes cipher text C3 by encrypting the OTP with the user password PWi  i.e= EPWi(OTP) and stores 
{IDi,C3}securely in its database.  
 
Login Stage: 
User Ui                                 Registration Server (RS)                  Backend Server (BS) 
Ui enters IDiכ 
                         {IDiכ}                                                         {IDiכ} 
 
                                                                                                  Indexes the database for IDi 
                                                                                                   Get  <IDi,C3> 
                                                                                           {C3} 
                        {C3} 
 
DPWi(C3) =OTP* 
                       {OTP*} 
 
                                               C1 = C2 mod 26 
                                              DOTP*(C1) = PWi 
                                             C4 = EPWi(OTP*) 
                                                                                        {C4} 
                                                                                     
                                                                                              Indexes the database for C4(= C3) 
                                                                                              Get  <IDi,C3> and return IDi 
                                                                                     {IDi} 
 
                                       Check received IDi from BS = IDi from Ui 
                       If yes, Ui is authenticated, else RS rejects the login request. 
 
The user Ui wish to login into Hadoop environment needs to perform the following computations: 
(L1) Ui submits {IDiכ} to registration server R.S. R.S forwards the same i.e{IDiכ}to B.S. 
(L2) On receiving the login message i.e{IDiכ} from R.S, B.S indexes its data base for <IDi*,C3> which it stored 
during login stage. B.S returns {C3} to R.S. On receiving the reply from B.S, R.S forwards the same i.e {C3} to Ui. 
(L3) On receiving the reply message {C3} from R.S, Ui decrypts C3 using its password PWi i.e DPWi(C3) to get  
OTP*. Ui forwards the same to R.S i.e{OTP*}. On receiving {OTP*}, R.S performs reversal operation on C2 to get 
C1. R.S performs decryption of C3 using the OTP* sent by Ui  i.e DOTP*(C1) = PWi.  
(L4) On getting Ui password i.e PWi, R.S computes C4 = EPWi(OTP*) and forwards {C4} to B.S. 
(L5) B.S indexes for C4 (=C3) and retrieves IDi from <IDi,C3> combination, stored during registration phase and 
forwards the same to R.S. On getting IDi from B.S, R.S cross checks, whether the received IDi from BS equals IDi*  
received from Ui. If both are equal, Ui is authenticated, else RS rejects the login request. 
(L6) Once Ui is authenticated and logs out after completing his action, R.S generates a new OTP i.e OTPnew and 
computes C1new = EOTPnew(PWi), C2new = C1 mod 26and updates its database value < C2> to <C2new>.  
3. Cryptanalysis of Nivethitha et al framework 
In this segment, we scrutinize the security strengths of Nivethitha et al [1] scheme, for that we will follow the 
similar threat model practiced by [3]: 
1. An opponent can monitor or eavesdrop or intercept all the messages exchanged between Ui and R.S, as these 
messages are exchanged over public internet. The messages exchanged between registration server R.S and back 
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end server B.S are not accessible to the public as these messages are assumed to be exchanged in private network 
internal to Hadoop environment. i.e the attacker ‘E’ is having access to {IDiכ}, {C3},{OTP*} as these are the 
messages exchanged between Ui and R.S during login stage.  
3.1 Fails to Resists Offline Password Guessing Attack 
      An attacker or opponent ‘E’, as discussed, can intercept the messages {IDi}, {C3},{OTP}. On achieving C3 = 
EPWi(OTP), ‘E’ can accomplish the subsequent steps to intercept the Ui password PWi: 
Step1: Guess a password PWg* from a uniformly distributed dictionary. 
Step 2: Compute DPWi*(C3) =OTP*, and verify whether OTP* is equal to OTP intercepted. If yes, the Ui original 
password is PWg* else ‘E’ re run the execution of step1. 
Once the attacker ‘E’ guess the correct password, on having {IDi, PWi}, ‘E’ can login into the system by 
impersonating Ui. ‘E’can also successfully decrypt the reply message {C3} sent by R.S to Ui  during  login phase.  
4. Our Enhanced Scheme 
     In this segment, we portray our proposed scheme. The main rationale of our enhanced scheme is to resist the 
security flaws set up in Nivethitha et al [1] scheme. 
 
Registration Stage: 
User Ui                                      Registration Server (RS)                  Backend Server (BS) 
 
Select IDi, PWi,a random number ai 
APWi =h(aiْPWi) 
                                     {IDi, APWi} 
  
                                                   Generate One Time Pad i.e OTP. 
                                                   CIDi =IDiْh(OTP) 
                                                   C1 = APWiْh(OTP).  
                                                   C2 = C1 mod 26 
                                                   store  <C2> in database                          
                                                                                             {CIDi,APWi,OTP} 
 
                                                                       C3 = h(APWi)ْOTP 
                                                                      IDi = CIDiْh(OTP) 
                                                               stores<IDi,C3> securely in its database. 
                                                Generates a random number {rui} 
                              {rui} 
 
                                                   Compute HIDi = h(IDi||X) 
                                        stores ruiْh(X||IDi) against HIDi in R.S database. 
 
(R1). Ui opts his identity IDi, password PWi, an arbitrary number ai and submits the registration request {IDi, APWi  
= h(aiْPWi)} to RS.  
(R2) On receiving the registration request, R.S generates one time pad key i.e OTP and computes CIDi = IDi ْ
h(OTP), C1 = APWiْh(OTP), C2 = C1 mod 26.R.S stores <C2> in its database. R.S forwards {CIDi, APWi, OTP} 
to the back end server (B.S).  On receiving the message {CIDi, APWi, OTP}, B.S computes C3 = h(APWi) ْOTP 
and IDi = CIDiْh(OTP) and stores <IDi,C3> securely in its database. 
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User Ui(rui)                                     Registration Server (RS)                     Backend Server (BS) 
                                                 HIDi =h(IDi||X) - >Ri = ruiْh(X||IDi) 
Ui enters IDiכ 
                         {IDiכ}                                                               {IDiכ} 
 
                                                                                                                Indexes the database for IDi 
                                                                                                                         Get  <IDi,C3> 
                                                                                                  {C3} 
 
                     {C3} 
 
C3ْh(APWi) = OTP* 
C4 = OTP*ْh(rui||IDi) 
                     {C4} 
 
                                             Compute: HIDi = h(IDi*||X) and h(X||IDi*)  
                                             retrieve Ri  = ruiْh(X||IDi) from database. 
                                             Interceptr ui = Riْh(X||IDi) 
                                             OTP* = C4ْh(rui||IDi*), C1 = C2 mod 26.    
                                             C1ْh(OTP*).= APWi,  C5 = h(APWi)ْh(OTP*) 
                                                                                                    {C5} 
 
                                                                                                                  Indexes the database for C5( = C3) 
                                                                                                                    Get  <IDi,C3>   and return IDi 
                                                                                                  {IDi} 
 
                                                   Check received IDi from BS = IDi* from Ui 
                                                   If yes, Ui is authenticated, else RS rejects the login request. 
                                                        C6 = h(APWi)ْnew) 
                       {C6} 
 
 
Both Ui and R.S updates their entries with new random number i.e new. 
 
The user Ui need to login into Hadoop environment, Ui performs the following computations: 
(L1) Ui submits {IDiכ} to registration server R.S. R.S forwards the same i.e {IDiכ} to B.S.  On receiving the login 
message i.e {IDiכ} from R.S, B.S indexes its data base for <IDi, C3>  which it stored during login stage. B.S returns 
{C3} to R.S. On receiving the reply from B.S, R.S forwards the same i.e {C3} to Ui. 
(L2) On receiving the reply message {C3} from R.S, Ui computes C3ْh(APWi) = OTP*, C4 = OTP*ْh(rui||IDi) 
where rui is the random number assigned by R.S to Ui during registration stage.Ui forwards {C4}to R.S.  
(L3) On receiving {C4}, R.S computes HIDi = h(IDi*||X),  h(X||IDi*) and retrieves rui from Ri = ruiْh(X||IDi) which 
is stored in its database. On getting rui, R.S computes OTP* = C4ْh(rui||IDi*), performs reversal operation on C2 to 
get C1. 
(L4) On computing C1, R.S proceeds to get APWi = C1ْh(OTP*) and computes C5 = h(APWi)ْh(OTP*). R.S 
forwards {C5} to B.S. B.S indexes for C5 (=C3) and retrieves IDi from <IDi,C3> combination, which is stored 
during registration phase and forwards the same to R.S. 
(L5) On getting IDi from B.S, R.S cross checks, whether the received IDi from BS equals IDi* received from Ui. 
If both are equal, Ui is authenticated, else RS rejects the login request. Once Ui is authenticated and logs out of 
Hadoop, after completing his action, R.S generates a new random number new and computes C6 = h(APWi) 
ْnew). R.S forwards {C6} to Ui and updates it database entry for Ui with new. 
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5. Security Analysis of Improved Scheme 
5.1 Resistance to Offline Password Guessing Attack 
      An attacker ‘E’, can intercept the messages {IDiכ}, {C3} and {C4} which are exchanged between Ui and R.S 
over public internet. On achieving IDi*, C3 = h(APWi)ْOTP = h(h(aiْPWi))ْOTP, C4 = OTP*ْh(rui||IDi). To 
perform password guessing attack on C3, the attacker must know ai, rui. But, ai, rui are random numbers of length 
128 bits. Hence, it is computationally impossible for an attacker to correctly guess ai or rui. Therefore, our scheme 
resists password guessing attack. 
5.2 Counter to Replay Attack 
      An attacker ‘E’ wish to replay a login message from Ui, i.e{C4} to R.S, as discussed in (L6), after every 
successful login of Ui, the random number rui gets changed. R.S may start processing a replay message from the 
attacker ‘E’ and compute C5 out of replayed C4 message and forward {C5} to B.S. On receiving {C5}, B.S searches 
in its database for {C5}, definitely B.S doesn’t find an entry for C5 (C3) in it database. Suppose if it finds an entry, 
definitely it is not for IDi. (As the replayed message C5, and C3 stored in back end server are computed using 
different random numbers). Hence, B.S doesn’t responds with a valid IDi. Therefore, R.S will reject the login 
request by ‘E’. Hence, we can confirm that our scheme is resistant to replay and impersonation attacks.  
6. Cost and Security analysis  
The cost comparison between the proposed user authentication service and Nivethitha et al [1] authentication 
service, illustrates that our authentication service requires only 15 hash operations compared to 50 hash operations 
by Nivethitha et al service. As discussed above, our service is very secure and resists all major cryptographic attacks 
with less computation cost compared to Nivethitha et al scheme. (in which the heavy weight cryptographic 
operations like encryption and decryption form the major computation force).  
7. Conclusion 
In this manuscript, we have analyzed Nivethitha et al  HDFS authentication scheme using one time pad (OTP). 
We have illustrated that their scheme is vulnerable to password guessing attack and on success of it, the attacker can 
perform all major attacks. To fix these issues, we have proposed a light weight OTP based authentication service for 
hadoop environment. We have analyzed our scheme in terms of both security front and cost front and illustrated that 
our authentication service resists all major cryptographic attacks. Hence, we can confirm that, our authentication 
service is light weight and robust and can be implemented in practical scenarios. 
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